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Abstract
We develop a Markov decision process (MDP) model to examine military medical
evacuation (MEDEVAC) dispatch policies in a combat environment. The problem of
deciding which aeromedical asset to dispatch to which service request is complicated
by the threat conditions at the service locations and the priority class of each casu-
alty event. We assume requests for MEDEVAC arrive sequentially, with the location
and the priority of each casualty known upon initiation of the request. The United
States military uses a 9-line MEDEVAC request system to classify casualties using
three priority levels: urgent (A), priority (B), and routine (C). Multiple casualties can
be present at a single casualty event with the highest priority casualty determining
the priority level for the casualty event. An armed escort may be required depend-
ing on the threat level indicated by the 9-line MEDEVAC request. The proposed
MDP model indicates how to optimally dispatch ambulatory helicopters to casualty
events in order to maximize the steady-state system utility. The utility gained from
servicing a specific request depends on the number of casualties, the priority classes
for each of the casualties therein, and the locations of both the servicing ambulatory
helicopter and casualty event. Instances of the dispatching problem are solved using
a value iteration dynamic programming algorithm. Computational examples are used
to investigate optimal dispatch policies under different threat situations and potential
armed escort delay. The computational examples are based upon combat operational
scenarios with United States Army MEDEVAC units in support of Operation En-
during Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan. Results indicate that a myopic policy is not
always the best method to use for quickly dispatching MEDEVAC units under differ-
iv
ing threat conditions while conducting combat operations under a variety of different
parameters.
Key words: Emergency Medical Dispatch, Markov decision processes, medical
evacuation (MEDEVAC)
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A MARKOV DECISION PROCESS MODEL FOR THE OPTIMAL
DISPATCH OF MILITARY MEDICAL EVACUATION ASSETS
I. Introduction
For United States military forces operating in a combat environment, there are
two options for transporting a casualty to the nearest medical facility. The first option
is to conduct a casualty evacuation (CASEVAC), which is simply transporting the
casualty from the point of injury to the nearest appropriate medical facility without
dedicated personnel to provide medical care enroute. The second option is to conduct
a medical evacuation (MEDEVAC), which requires a 9-line MEDEVAC request sub-
mission and includes dedicated medical personnel to treat the casualty during transit.
The MEDEVAC mission commonly refers to the use of dedicated rotary wing aircraft
(i.e., ambulatory helicopters) equipped with medical personnel and equipment [10]. 1
An important task during combat operations, MEDEVAC missions are primarily
conducted by the United States Army. MEDEVAC provides timely and efficient
medical treatment and transportation for casualties on the battlefield enroute to
the nearest required medical facility. Revolutionizing the level of medical treatment
a casualty receives in a timely manner, MEDEVAC missions greatly increase the
probability of a patient’s survivability [9].
The concept of extracting casualties from the battlefield during combat in order
to preserve life was introduced during the American Civil War. The CASEVAC and
MEDEVAC systems continually improved during the next seven major American
conflicts, from the Spanish-American War in 1898 to the War on Terror in 2014. Such
1With the exception of Sections 1 and 2, in this paper we use the term MEDEVAC in reference
to ambulatory helicopters only
1
evolvement consisted of using horse-drawn wagons for CASEVAC in the Spanish-
American War in 1898, motorized ground-vehicles for CASEVAC in World War I,
helicopters for CASEVAC in World War II and the Korean War, to eventually using
helicopters for MEDEVAC beginning during the Vietnam War; This method continues
to be the current primary method of MEDEVAC today. With over a century of
development and technological advancement, the current MEDEVAC system is quite
successful in preserving the lives of many wounded soldiers [21]. However, challenges
remain.
Challenges in the current MEDEVAC system include optimizing the location of
MEDEVAC units, determining dispatch policies, and repositioning units following a
mission. Much research over the past four decades seeks to optimize both the military
and civilian emergency systems [19]. These studies analyze several different aspects
of optimizing the emergency response systems: ambulance location, repositioning
the ambulances post mission, and ambulance dispatch policy considering response
time, patient survivability probability, and patient priority level. While much of
the research since the late 1960’s focuses on the civilian emergency response system,
numerous studies analyze the MEDEVAC system quite extensively as well.
Many authors analyze problems similar to those mentioned above but in a combat
environment. For example, Fulton et al. [16] analyze deployable hospital locations,
MEDEVAC unit location, and the MEDEVAC dispatch policy in order to minimize
response time. Bastian [3] analyzes how to position MEDEVAC units in order to
maximize their coverage capability. Our paper also considers an emergency response
system operating in a combat environment. We examine the problem of optimally
dispatching ambulatory helicopters to prioritized casualty events in order to maximize
steady state system utility. Our dispatch policy is based on the location of idle
MEDEVAC units, the location of the casualty event, the number of casualties within
2
the casualty event, and the priority of the casualties at the casualty event. We
define the individual casualty priority levels from the field medical service technician
student manual [12]. They are as follows: Urgent (A) means the casualty must be
evacuated as soon as possible or within two hours due to possible loss of life, limb, or
eyesight; Priority (B) means the casualty must be evacuated within four hours and
the condition can worsen to Urgent (A); Routine (C) means the casualty must be
evacuated within 24 hours.
We formulate an infinite-horizon, undiscounted, average reward Markov decision
process (MDP) that determines how to optimally dispatch MEDEVAC helicopters to
casualty events on the battlefield in order to maximize the steady-state average of
system utility. A computational example is applied to a MEDEVAC system forward
deployed in Afghanistan in support of combat operations. We analyze the optimal
policies and the effect that an armed escort requirement under specified threat con-
ditions has on the optimal performance of these policies and compare them with a
myopic policy (i.e., simply dispatching the closest unit to each casualty). We assume
that the medical treatment facility (MTF) and combat support hospital (CSH) loca-
tions are fixed, and that all MEDEVAC helicopters have the same capacities and can
be configured to meet the mission requirements specified by the 9-line MEDEVAC
request.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents further background on
MEDEVAC and provides a review of pertinent literature. Section 3 provides a de-
scription of the problem for which we develop our model. Section 4 describes the
general MDP model we use to determine an optimal MEDEVAC dispatch policy in
the context of the problem. Section 5 describes an application of the specific MDP
model to the analysis of an example based on current day combat operations in
3
Afghanistan. Section 6 provides conclusions and directions for future research.
4
II. Background
Howard [21] points out that before the American Civil War the notion of evacuat-
ing casualties from the battlefield and rendering medical aid to them while en route to
the nearest medical facility was nothing more than an afterthought in the US Army’s
doctrine. With a total of approximately 620,000 soldiers killed in action during the
Civil War, the need for such a service was quickly realized [8]. In 1862, after sev-
eral battles resulted in thousands of wounded soldiers remaining on the battlefield
for days, many of whom took it upon themselves to walk unaided back to friendly
territory, a solution was conceived. Jonathan Letterman, the Medical Director of the
Army of the Potomac, began developing a system for evacuating casualties from the
front lines of the battlefield. His system required that the military dedicate personnel
and resources to the mission of evacuating casualties. This system was standardized
during the Spanish-American War in 1898. Nearly two decades later, World War I
saw numerous advancements in medical technology that resulted in the improvement
of the CASEVAC mission. The first aerial CASEVAC mission occurred during this
war using a modified French airplane. World War II saw many more medical ad-
vancements, but the idea of an aerial MEDEVAC was disregarded by top levels of
the military due to the risk to the casualties. Although this negative outlook halted
nearly all battlefield MEDEVACs, the first large-scale combat aero-medical evacua-
tion occurred in 1942 and was followed by several more until the end of the war in
1945. At the war’s end, more than 1.1 million casualties had been medically evacu-
ated by airplane. Although using air assets to medically evacuate casualties directly
from the battlefield did not occur often at this time, the first rotary wing CASEVAC
mission took place in 1944 near Mawla, Burma where casualties were rescued from
stranded forces [21].
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As the technology of rotary wing aircraft advanced between World War II and the
Korean War, the Secretary of Defense directed that the primary means of CASEVAC
for sick and injured soldiers during war or peacetime would be by air. Therefore,
helicopters were first used as the primary vehicle for evacuating casualties during
the Korean War, and their use was further perfected during the Vietnam War with
the production of the Bell UH-1 Iroquois, or Huey, helicopter. This aircraft accom-
modated more litters and provided the essential space necessary to conduct in-flight
medical treatment. Today, over half a century later, the helicopter, now the UH-60
Blackhawk, continues to be the primary means of MEDEVAC [21].
Over the past four decades, many studies focus on optimizing emergency response
systems for both civilian and military applications. Past research examines the orig-
inating locations of the emergency units, the dispatch policies that stipulate which
unit responds to which service call, and the repositioning of emergency units to spe-
cific locations to improve system response times. In the last decade, the US Army
has implemented the results of that research during combat operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
The MEDEVAC mission is heavily relied upon for current combat operations
in Afghanistan due to the rugged terrain and austere environment. Between 2007
and 2008, over 2060 MEDEVAC missions were flown to evacuate more than 3200
casualties, of which 30% of the casualties were classified as Urgent (A) [20]. The
stated MEDEVAC goal, as directed by the Secretary of Defense, is to transport
an urgent casualty to an appropriate medical facility within 60 minutes [17] from
the receipt of the 9-line MEDEVAC request. In 2007, 12% of MEDEVAC mission
service times were outside the two-hour maximum timeline for an Urgent patient.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces reduced that figure to 7% by 2008
simply by operationally improving command and control and increasing the number
6
of MEDEVAC aircraft. As a result, despite a higher operational tempo and increased
violence during those years, the rate of soldiers killed in action (KIA) decreased while
the rate of soldiers wounded in action (WIA) increased [20]. This result indicates an
improvement in the MEDEVAC system.
Although recent improvements have been made in the MEDEVAC system, differ-
ent aspects of the system still require investigation. The Army’s MEDEVAC policies
and procedures must continue to adapt to changes in enemy tactics. This fact is
critically important when reviewing and optimizing recent MEDEVAC policies and
procedures because, unlike enemies that adhere to the Geneva Convention, the in-
surgents in Afghanistan consider medical vehicles to be viable targets. Garrett [17]
points out that, despite the clearly identifiable red cross marking, MEDEVAC aircraft
operating in Afghanistan sustain the same ratio of small arms fire hits as other armed
aircraft. As a result, many areas in Afghanistan require the MEDEVAC unit to be
accompanied by an armed escort. This is an essential factor that cannot be ignored.
This requirement has the adverse effect of potentially incurring a significant amount
of response time due to engine warm-up and weapon systems inspections, among other
factors [20]. Although Garrett [17] states that from January 2010 to April 2012, only
31% of MEDEVAC missions required an armed escort, and of those missions only 4%
of them were delayed as a result of the armed escort units, extra time spent wait-
ing for armed escort availability causes an increase in MEDEVAC response time, no
matter how infrequently it is needed.
Another problem with the current MEDEVAC system in Afghanistan involves the
amount of acceptable coverage throughout the country. Hartenstein [20] shows the
MEDEVAC coverage capabilities in Afghanistan and points out that adequate service
to most areas in the country can be delivered within a two-hour response time, where
response time is defined as the time it takes for the unit to transport the individual(s)
7
from the casualty site to the appropriate medical facility from the receipt of a 9-line
MEDEVAC request. However, when that response time requirement decreases to 60
minutes in Afghanistan, numerous gaps exist in coverage capabilities due to the vast
expanse of the region.
Hartenstein [20] argues that a significant improvement in response time would
not be achieved even if the number of MEDEVAC units and the number of medical
facilities is increased. This indicates that system improvements must focus elsewhere,
possibly with an optimal dispatch policy of the MEDEVAC unit considering the
possibility of an armed escort delay. While this study focuses on the conflict in
Afghanistan, it is intended to be useful in future conflicts and training environments
as well.
The decision-making process in the emergency response system is very complex,
whether it is the civilian EMS system or the military MEDEVAC system during
combat operations. Multiple factors are involved in each step of the process such as
district location, the number of servers (i.e., MEDEVAC units) per district, dispatch
policy, server location, repositioning the server location, or whether to focus on re-
sponse time or patient survivability as the objective. Various methods are used to
examine the EMS systems. These methods include, but are not limited to, discrete
optimization, stochastic modeling, queuing, and simulation modeling [26].
Research from the late 1960’s and 1970’s focuses primarily on the civilian EMS
system. These studies examine aspects such as the optimal placement of emergency
vehicles, including both original placement and relocation, to provide the fastest
response time. Math programming and stochastic models are often used to solve such
problems. Few studies focus on optimizing the dispatch policy in order to improve the
performance of the EMS system. Even fewer seek to improve the performance of the
MEDEVAC system. Examining the dispatch policy of emergency response vehicles
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requires a dynamic and stochastic approach such as agent-based simulation or MDP
modeling. Moreover, many EMS systems’ dispatch policies do not take the priority
level of the casualty event into consideration. This results in the nearest emergency
response team fulfilling the requirement with no regard to the void created in the
system by that unit’s temporary absence. This is known as a myopic policy, and such
policies have been proven to be inadequate by many researchers [26, 1, 25].
Bandara et al. [1] mention several studies in which the EMS system greatly im-
proves the patients’ survival probability if their priority level is taken into consider-
ation when deciding which vehicle to dispatch. Therefore, they build a model that
focuses on the urgency level of an emergency call. In order to properly consider the
optimal policies for decision-making at each discrete time epoch, they use the uni-
formization method to convert the continuous-time MDP that they initially develop
into an equivalent discrete-time MDP. Their study reveals that the optimal policy
is to send the closest unit to the most urgent call and the next idle unit to the less
urgent call, regardless of the call order. While this result may seem intuitive, this
dispatch policy quickly becomes complex. For example, it may be more optimal to
dispatch a vehicle that is farther if the closer vehicle is more likely to receive a higher
priority call. This policy essentially rations the closer vehicle in anticipation of a more
urgent request. For problems with several more service zones and ambulances, the
policy might not be as intuitive although EMS systems stand to benefit greatly from
the employment of an optimal policy versus a myopic policy.
Mayorga et al. [26] also examine the dispatch policy within the EMS system. Their
research improves the performance of the EMS system where performance is defined
as the probability of patient survivability as it is correlated with response times.
Before they examine the dispatch policies, however, they examine the number of
districts and district locations by developing a constructive heuristic. Their research
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provides more depth than previous studies by analyzing the dispatch policies for
inter-district and intra-district situations. An intra-district situation occurs when
a response vehicle within its own district services the call, whereas an inter-district
situation occurs when all response vehicles within a district area are busy and the call
must be serviced by a response vehicle from a different district. For the inter-district
policy, either a myopic policy (closest vehicle responds) or a heuristic policy (e.g., as
developed in Bandara et al. [1]) is used. While the myopic policy is the most widely
used policy in the EMS system, the heuristic policy considers the priority of the call
as well as the workload of each crew. For such an implementation, a utilization factor
is used in order to consider the workload of each crew. For the intra-district policy,
two policies are considered. The first policy assumes that a sister emergency service
(fire department or police department) would respond. The military equivalent of this
during combat operations would be to have the casualty’s unit conduct first aid and
transport him/her to the nearest CSH or MTF using its own vehicles, a quick reaction
force (QRF), or non-medical helicopter; this is known as a non-standard CASEVAC.
The second policy uses the heuristic policy that Bandara et al. [1] developed and
allows a response vehicle from another district to cross boundary lines.
While examining the dispatch policy within the EMS system, McLay & Mayorga
[28] also analyze the optimization problem with regard to classification errors. They
focus on the patients’ urgency level with an overall objective of maximizing the aver-
age long run utility of the EMS system, rewarding the expected coverage of high-risk
patients. The response time threshold (RTT) that they utilize within their utility
calculations, however, is much lower than the RTT used in our calculations because
they define the response time as the time it takes from when the ambulance is dis-
patched to when it arrives at the injury site. The utilities used in their model are
dependent on both the patient and the hospital locations. Similar to the research
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done by Bandara et al. [1], they use the uniformization method in order to convert
their initially developed continuous-time MDP into an equivalent discrete-time MDP.
Our paper follows much of the work of Bandara et al. [1] and McLay & Mayorga
[28], given that we also focus much effort on the priority level of the call. We also ini-
tially develop a continuous-time MDP and use the uniformization method to convert
it to a discrete-time MDP in order to allow the stipulation of an optimal dispatch
policy wherein decisions are made at discrete-time events. We design our model so
that the actions are dependent on the locations of the MEDEVAC units, casualty
event, and casualty event classification. We define our objective as maximizing the
average long-run system utility, as does McLay & Mayorga [28]. Our research is also
similar to Mayorga et al. [26] in that our approach allows an inter-district policy. All
four papers, including this one, adopt a stochastic approach in the development of a
MDP. However, this paper focuses on a military application and therefore has several
complex aspects that are not examined in previous research.
Fulton et al. [16] and Bastian [2] examine stochastic optimization for the alloca-
tion of MEDEVAC units in steady-state combat operations. Fulton et al. [16] present
a stochastic optimization model that relocates deployable hospitals, reallocates hos-
pital beds, and determines where emergency response vehicles (both air and ground
MEDEVAC) should be located prior to a 9-line MEDEVAC request. Their objective
is to minimize the amount of time it takes for the MEDEVAC unit to respond and
transport the casualty or casualties to the appropriate medical facility. Fulton et al.
[16] describe a model that focuses on patient severity in order to make the dispatch
decision rather than the proximity to the patient. Their patient severity is deter-
mined from the historical data collection of patients’ injury severity scores (ISS) from
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). They make many of the same assumptions we make
in this paper: since the missions are being conducted during stability operations, the
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number of helicopters, ground ambulances, and crew members are fixed. Their idea
of using ISS patient survival probabilities in the model is loosely based on the re-
search by Silva & Serra [31] regarding the importance of recognizing priority levels of
patients. The work by Bastian [2] describes a multi-criteria modeling approach that
optimizes the emplacement of MEDEVAC assets. Specifically, his work maximizes
casualty demand coverage and minimizes MEDEVAC spare capacity and site attack
vulnerability, whereas our research provides an optimal dispatch policy in order to
maximize the average long-run system utility.
The work by Schmid [30] uses approximate dynamic programming (ADP) in order
to determine optimal policies that minimize response times. Using real data from the
EMS system in Vienna, Austria, Schmid [30] suggests that a dispatch policy that
deviates from the ordinary dispatch policies used can result in a nearly 13% decrease
in expected system response time. Service calls used in the model from this data were
generated using a spatial Poisson process, which is the same type of process that we
use and describe at the end of Section 3. Although their paper examines ambulance
relocation and considers a civilian EMS system and we do not, more similarities than
differences exist between our research. For example, the graphical representation
that Schmid [30] offers in his Problem Description section is used as a basis for our
MEDEVAC Mission Timeline, as shown later in Figure 1.
Many more research studies relate at least topically to our problem and provide
important insight into what has already been studied. For example, Berman [4] fo-
cuses on repositioning ambulances for follow-on service calls to minimize expected
long-term travel times within the system. In his research, the dispatcher uses a my-
opic policy and only considers repositioning idle ambulances in order to compensate
for areas not covered by busy ambulances. Maxwell et al. [25] use ADP to make deci-
sions on where to redeploy ambulances within the EMS system in order to maximize
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the number of calls reached within a delay threshold. Erkut et al. [13] incorporate a
survival function into existing covering models in order to generate new ambulance
location models. More useful in our research, while considering our motivating prob-
lem in Afghanistan, Chanta et al. [5] focus on ambulance coverage for rural areas.
Since many missions in Afghanistan are conducted in an austere, rural environment,
the trade-off between efficiency (coverage) and equity between rural and urban zones
examined in their research provides some relevance. However, their particular re-
search focuses on developing a covering location model specific to ground ambulatory
care. All of these papers provide possible methodologies on how to examine problems
concerning the emergency response system and offer contributions to the development
of our research.
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III. Problem Description
In the remainder of this paper we use the term MEDEVAC to refer to ambulatory
helicopters only. MEDEVAC requests are submitted with very little, if any, lead
time. This means that there is no time to prepare for them, and a quick response
is necessary in order to achieve success in such a mission. To complicate matters,
many situations with a high threat level may require a team of armed helicopters
to escort the MEDEVAC unit to the casualty site, creating the potential for further
delays in the response time. Consequently, the MEDEVAC system must be extremely
flexible and eliminate any decision-making delays in order to optimize its performance.
Developing an optimal policy for such decision-making assists in making this possible.
The assumptions for the model we develop for this problem are below:
We consider three types of calls: Urgent (Category A), Priority (Category B),
Routine (Category C). 9-line MEDEVAC requests use the same three priorities in
order to classify casualties. All emergency types (A, B, or C) can be serviced by
any MEDEVAC platform; therefore, we assume all necessary additional equipment
is located on every MEDEVAC helicopter. The classification of the casualty event is
defined as the highest classification level present at the casualty event (i.e., the most
severe casualty).
A single casualty event can have between one and four casualties. Athough more
than four casualties can occur on a battlefield, placing this constraint on our model
allows only one MEDEVAC aircraft/unit to be dispatched for each casualty event.
This
Response and service times are independent of the casualty event classification.
Although a Routine casualty event allows a response time of 24 hours in combat
situations, we assume that all 9-line MEDEVAC requests are serviced immediately,
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regardless of the priority classification, if a MEDEVAC unit is available. This enables
us to better examine the dispatch process properly.
There is zero-length queue for casualties; if a 9-line MEDEVAC request cannot
be serviced immediately, we assume a non-standard CASEVAC (e.g., non-medical
ground or air platform) is conducted. These are common missions according to Black-
hawk pilots and OEF veterans [15].
Inter-zone policies, where a MEDEVAC unit from an adjacent casualty zone can
be dispatched to service the 9-line request, are always allowed. This allows nearby
MEDEVAC units to assist with 9-line MEDEVAC requests if needed. It also creates
the need for the model to decide which MEDEVAC unit to dispatch to which casualty
event, thereby making the problem interesting.
Casualties are evacuated to the nearest MTF, thereby assuming that all MTFs in
the area have the same capabilities. Also, if a casualty occurs within close proximity
(e.g., less than a 10 minute drive) of a MTF, the unit on the ground conducts a
CASEVAC in lieu of requesting a 9-line. This is often the case in combat since
transporting a casualty that is near a MTF will take less time than it will to dispatch
a MEDEVAC unit.
After a MEDEVAC unit has completed its mission, it must return to its staging
area before being dispatched again in order to refuel and restock medical supplies.
The MEDEVAC dispatching process for a situation requiring an armed escort
closely follows the process outlined by Schmid [30] and is described in the timeline
depicted graphically in Figure 1.
Once the 9-line MEDEVAC request is received by an approving authority and the
priority level of the request is determined, the appropriate idle MEDEVAC unit is
notified and dispatched to the casualty site.
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Figure 1. MEDEVAC Mission Timeline
As depicted in Figure 1, the time that the 9-line MEDEVAC request is received
is denoted by t9, the time at which the MEDEVAC unit is assigned to the mission is
denoted by M9, and the time at which the MEDEVAC unit departs is denoted by Md.
The amount of time required between the receipt of the 9-line MEDEVAC request,
t9, and the MEDEVAC departure, Md, is the total dispatching time, D. This time
encompasses the process of determining which MEDEVAC unit to dispatch, whether
an armed escort is required or not, which armed escort unit to dispatch, if required,
notifying the units, and finally the mission, helicopter, and personnel preparation
time. MEDEVAC units arrive at the casualty site after traveling for T c minutes and
begin treating and loading the casualty at time wc9 after waiting E minutes for the
armed escort, if required, to arrive. Initial treatment and loading ends when the
MEDEVAC helicopter departs the casualty site enroute to the appropriate medical
facility and is denoted by ec9. The amount of time spent at the casualty site is L
c.
After traveling to the appropriate medical facility for Tm minutes, the casualty is
unloaded from time wm9 to time e
m
9 after which the casualty is inside the medical
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facility. The total unload time is denoted by Um. Once the casualty is unloaded
at the medical facility, the MEDEVAC unit travels for T s minutes to its respective
staging area. Once the MEDEVAC unit arrives at its staging area after ws9 minutes,
its mission is complete and it becomes available for dispatch once again.
Note that travel times from the staging area to the casualty site, T c, from the
casualty site to an appropriate medical facility, Tm, and from the medical facility
back to the staging area, T s are expected to vary based on the conditions of the
battlefield (e.g., weather conditions, enemy positions, equipment load). The load and
unload times, Lc and Um, respectively, of the casualties also vary.
EMS systems typically refer to response time as the amount of time required to
reach the patient after receiving an emergency call. According to McLay & Mayorga
[27], the rapid response to cardiac arrest situations are a primary focus in the EMS
system. This is because the EMS system is often evaluated on how it responds to
emergency cardiac arrest calls since there is effective treatment for them and they
are highly time sensitive. Also, if the EMS system can respond quickly enough to
a cardiac arrest call, they are more likely to be successful with similar life-or-death
situations. Therefore, it is quite intuitive that the response time for a civilian EMS
system is typically defined as the time between the receipt of the emergency call and
the time the first emergency response vehicle arrives at the injury site [1].
However, the performance of the MEDEVAC system cannot be evaluated by the
same measures as the EMS system since several additional factors are involved when
medically evacuating a casualty from a battlefield. Not only can the load times,
travel times and unload times be much greater and vary by much more, but the
primary cause of death on the battlefield is blood loss, not cardiac arrest. Very
recent improvements have been made in this area by equipping MEDEVAC units
with in-flight blood transfusion capabilities, but not enough data has been generated
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to alter the MEDEVAC system’s evaluation measure at the time of our research [24].
Garrett [17] reports that 85% of soldiers killed in action (KIA) were a direct result
of blood loss. Thus, we consider it to be far more critical to get the casualty to the
nearest MTF and into surgery than to simply reach him quickly. We define response
time, denoted as Rij, for MEDEVAC j responding to a casualty event in zone i, as
the sum of the dispatch time, D, travel time to the casualty site, T c, potential armed
escort delay, E, the load time at the casualty site, Lc, travel time to the appropriate
MTF, Tm, and the unload time at the MTF, Um:
Rij = D + T
c + E + Lc + Tm + Um. (3.1)
Service time, denoted by Vij, is simply the sum of the response time, Rij, and the
travel time back to the staging area, T s:
Vij = Rij + T
s. (3.2)
In order to provide a solution to the problem described in this section, we outline
a general model in section 4 that will prove helpful when applied.
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IV. Model Formulation
In this section we present a MDP model formulation for determining an optimal
MEDEVAC dispatch policy. The objective of this MDP model is to provide an
optimal policy that determines which MEDEVAC unit to dispatch in response to a
9-line MEDEVAC request in order to maximize the long-run average utility over an
undiscounted, infinite horizon. We assume 9-line MEDEVAC requests (corresponding
to casualty events) arrive according to a Poisson process with rate λ.
We require the following input parameters for our model:
λ = 9-line MEDEVAC request arrival rate, per minute, to the entire system.
φi = proportion of 9-line MEDEVAC requests from demand zone i such that:
n∑
i=1
φi = 1.
d = total number of demand zones.
m = total number of MEDEVAC units.
pk = proportion of priority k 9-line MEDEVAC requests such that:
3∑
k=1
pk = 1.
ψkij = utility gained by MEDEVAC j servicing a casualty event with priority k in
zone i dependent on the RTT.
µij = service rate, per minute, of MEDEVAC j when servicing a casualty event
in zone i.
The MDP model formulation is described below:
States :
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Let st denote the state of the MEDEVAC system at time t. The state st is the
vector st = (s1t, s2t, ..., smt), where sjt denotes the state of MEDEVAC j at time t:
sjt =

i if MEDEVAC j is responding to a 9-line MEDEVAC request in zone i at time t.
0 if MEDEVAC j is idle at time t.
The state space is defined by S as:
S = {s : s ∈ {0, 1, ..., d}m},with |S| = (d+ 1)m.
For example, consider a system with four MEDEVAC units located in four separate
zones. When MEDEVAC 2 is busy and all other MEDEVAC units are idle we would
have:
st = (0, i, 0, 0),where i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}.
Decisions :
The decision in our model is which MEDEVAC unit to dispatch upon receipt of
a 9-line MEDEVAC request in response to a given casualty event. Let A = A(st)
denote the set of available actions in state st upon receipt of a 9-line MEDEVAC
request. Note that in our computational example in Section 5, both intra and inter-
zone responses are allowed; however, MEDEVAC units are restricted from responding
to casualty events more than one zone away from their staging location. That is, in
the event that zone 2 has a casualty event, only MEDEVAC units from zones 1, 2,
or 3 are allowed to respond. Such constraints on the control space can be enforced
as required by the context of the particular problem instance. We assume that if an
idle MEDEVAC unit is located in or adjacent to the zone where the casualty event
occurred, it will be dispatched, not to exceed m actions in each state. For example,
consider the system described above with four MEDEVAC units and four zones; if the
MEDEVAC unit in Zone 3 is busy when a 9-line request is submitted for a casualty
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event in Zone 3, only MEDEVAC units in Zones 2 or 4 can respond, resulting in
A(st) = {2, 4} when st = (0, 0, y, 0), y 6= 0. In our model, the decisions within the
decision space, A(st), are restricted so that the location of the busy MEDEVAC unit
is independent of the decisions available.
Rewards :
An immediate expected utility ψkij is obtained when MEDEVAC unit j responds
to a casualty event of priority class k that occurs in Zone i. The utility gained
depends on the location and priority of the casualty event as well as the originating
location of the servicing MEDEVAC. While it is often true when studying civilian
EMS systems that rewards can be derived from historical data, in a military context
data is often missing, restricted, or simply irrelevant given new conditions in the
area of operations (e.g., friendly forces are engaging the enemy in different locations).
To obtain the utilities so that we may examine the dynamics of the MEDEVAC
dispatching problem, we simulate the MEDEVAC process.
A single casualty event results in α casualties, where α is a discrete random
variable with support {1,2,...,Nα}. We assume Nα is less than or equal to the servic-
ing capacity of one MEDEVAC helicopter. Each casualty is labeled as Urgent (A),
Priority (B), or Routine (C), corresponding to a priority index level of h = 1,2,3,
respectively. Let q = (q1, q2, q3) denote the probabilities of a casualty belonging to
a particular priority class, where qh is the probability a casualty belongs to priority
class h. Let c = (c1, c2, c3) denote the casualties present at a single casualty event,
where ch is the number of casualties belonging to priority class h. It follows that c is
a multinomial random variable with a probability mass function f(c|α,q) and that
the proportion of priority k 9-line MEDEVAC requests, pk are:
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pk =

Pr{c1 > 0}, k = 1,
Pr{c1 = 0, c2 > 0}, k = 2,
Pr{c1 = 0, c2 = 0}, k = 3.
The utility rh is gained by servicing a priority h casualty, where r1 > r2 > r3 ≥ 0.
Since we are most interested in servicing casualty events with life-threatening (i.e.,
Urgent) injuries, we adopt a reward structure that incentivizes the servicing of such
casualties and diminishes the importance of servicing a casualty event with no life-
threatening injuries (i.e., Routine). The system gains an expected utility of u(c) for
servicing a single casualty event c, where
u(c) =
3∑
h=1
rhchf(ch|α,q).
Since we are able to classify a casualty event according to the most severe injury
sustained at the casualty event prior to the determination of which MEDEVAC to
send, we are able to denote an expected utility
uk(c) =
3∑
h=k
rhchf(ch|α,q),
where k is the priority class of the casualty event. Note that k = 1 indicates that
c1 > 0, k = 2 indicates c1 = 0, c2 > 0, and k = 3 indicates c1 = 0, c2 = 0.
There is a requirement that Rij, the response time of MEDEVAC j servicing a
casualty event in Zone i, must not exceed the RTT in order for the system to be
rewarded. This requirement is captured when expressing the expected utility gained
by MEDEVAC j servicing a single priority k casualty event c in Zone i as:
ψkij(c) = uk(c)IRij≤RTT ,
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where IRij≤RTT is an indicator variable which equals 1 when Rij ≤ RTT and 0
otherwise. When considering a particular instance of our MEDEVAC dispatching
problem, we obtain an average utility ψkij and an expected service rate µij for each
zone, MEDEVAC, and priority permutation by simulating the MEDEVAC process for
a large number of casualty events and computing the mean utilities and service times.
Of particular importance in our simulation procedure is the impact of casualty event
cluster locations on the response times and hence the utilities. Further discussion of
the simulation process is provided in Section 5.
Transitions :
State transitions are Markovian with two possible event types governing the tran-
sition. The first event type is the completion of service by one of the busy MEDEVAC
units. The second event type is the arrival of a 9-line MEDEVAC request which must
be responded to by a MEDEVAC unit if possible.
Optimality Equations :
Puterman [29] argues that the application of uniformization is desirable when
analyzing continuous-time MDPs. Uniformization allows us to state an equivalent
discrete-time MDP problem formulation. We proceed by determining the maximum
rate of transition:
ν = λ+
m∑
j=1
βj,
where
βj = max
i=1,2,...,d
µij.
We use value iteration to find an optimal policy. Let Jt(st) denote the value of
being in state st during iteration t. We initialize our value function so that J0(s) = 0
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for all s ∈ S. We follow the basic form of McLay & Mayorga [28] in defining our
optimality equations. They are as follows:
Jn+1(st) =
1
ν
[
m∑
j=1
I{st=i|i>0}µijJn(s1, s2, ..., sj−1, 0, sj+1, ..., sm) (4.1)
+
d∑
i=1
3∑
k=1
λipk max
j∈A(st)
{I{sj=0}Jn(s1, s2, ..., sj−1, i, sj+1, ..., sm) + (ν)(ψkij)}
+ (ν − λ−
m∑
j=1
I{sj=i|i>0}µij)Jn(st)
]
, for n = 0, 1, ...,
where
I{sj=i|i>0} = indicator variable that denotes MEDEVAC j is busy in Zone i,
I{sj=0} = indicator variable that denotes MEDEVAC j is idle,
A(st) = the set of available decisions in state st.
The first term in Equation 4.1 describes busy MEDEVAC units becoming idle, the
second term describes new 9-line MEDEVAC requests arriving to the system, where
A(st) represents the available decisions in state st, and the third term describes the
system remaining in the same state with no new 9-line MEDEVAC requests or any
MEDEVAC units becoming idle.
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V. Computational Example: Four zones and four
MEDEVAC units
In this section, we apply the MDP model to an example set in Afghanistan during
steady state combat operations.
5.1 Estimating Model Parameters
We present an example in which MEDEVAC units are dispatched during steady
state combat operations in support of OEF. The southern portion of Afghanistan is
the area of operation (AO) and is divided into four separate zones, d = 4: Nimroz
province (Zone 1), Helmand province (Zone 2), Kandahar province (Zone 3), and
Zabul province (Zone 4). We use four MEDEVAC helicopters, m = 4, with one
located in each of the four separate zones. The MEDEVAC units transport casualties
to one of two MTFs, located in either Zone 2 or 3. Zones 1 and 4 do not have
MTFs. The placement of medical assets represents a general realism based on past
enemy activity in southern Afghanistan and the author’s combat experience. Based
on historical data, as well as the author’s experience in Afghanistan, the casualty rate
in Zones 2 and 3 are much higher than in Zones 1 and 4.
According to icasualties.org [22], Helmand and Kandahar have been the two most
casualty producing provinces in Afghanistan during OEF with 944 and 544 personnel
killed in action (KIA) alone, respectively. These numbers are compared to six KIAs
in Nimroz and 118 KIAs in Zabul. Although these numbers do not account for the
numerous other casualties that would include personnel wounded in action (WIA),
they provide an approximation of the threat present in each zone. We use this infor-
mation to parameterize φi, the proportion of casualties from Zone i. Straight forward
25
calculations give us casualty proportions per zone of 0.4% in Zone 1, 58.5% in Zone 2,
33.8% in Zone 3, and 7.3% in Zone 4. This gives us φ = (0.004, 0.585, 0.338, 0.073).
These casualty proportions are consistent with the greater number of people,
Afghan citizens as well as enemy and friendly combatants, that are present in both
Helmand and Kandahar. According to the Afghan government, Zones 1-4 have pop-
ulations of approximately 156,000 people, 880,000 people, 1.15 million people, and
289,000 people, respectively [7]. Moreover, according to Department of the Army
[11] as well as the author’s experience in Afghanistan, it is reasonable to expect that
one brigade combat team (BCT) would be assigned Zones 1 and 2 as its area of re-
sponsibility (AOR) and that the BCT would most likely assign the majority of its
combat power to Zone 2 while assigning one task force (TF), which is a reinforced
battalion, to Zone 1. Likewise, one BCT would be assigned Zones 3 and 4 as its AOR
while assigning the majority of its combat power in Zone 3 and one TF to one 4.
The ratio of citizens and combatants in each zone suggests that more casualty events
are expected to occur in Zones 2 and 3. Therefore, the MEDEVAC units located in
Helmand and Kandahar provinces, Zones 2 and 3, respectively, are co-located with
the MTFs.
Actual data for casualty, MEDEVAC unit, and MTF locations are restricted. Mil-
itary medical planners anticipate future operations when estimating casualty event
arrivals. Therefore, in order to compute utilities, we first generate the response and
service times described in Section 3. To avoid using specific data from Afghanistan in
order to maintain operational security while OEF stability operations are on going,
we develop a procedure that leverages military medical planning techniques and the
combat infantry background of the author to model where future casualties may be
sustained. Data from past experiences obviously informs this process, but future op-
erations are important as well; data will certainly change with each unique conflict.
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Therefore, in the absence of data, we develop a Monte Carlo simulation that uses
casualty cluster centers as a point of reference. Casualty cluster centers are selected
based on their close proximity to main supply routes (MSR) and rivers where popula-
tion groupings are present, since these demographic and geographical features indicate
common sites of attack during missions supporting OEF. Using these casualty clus-
ter centers, we employ a Poisson cluster process to model the arrival and location
of casualty events. Since insurgent attacks against coalition forces in Afghanistan
closely resemble crime patterns, they can be analyzed as a contagion-like process.
The Hawkes spatial generation process (see Kroese & Botev [23] for a discussion)
provides the basis of our collection of utilities as well as response and service time
information. This process models situations where, for a single casualty event, a
number of subsequent events are expected to occur within a close spatial proximity
of the first event according to a Poisson distribution.
We use MATLAB in order to display a map of our AO as shown in Figure 2, and to
determine casualty cluster centers, as well as corresponding casualty events as shown
in Figure 3. We also employ our Monte Carlo simulation and subsequently calculate
the response and service times as well as the utilities for given dispatch decisions.
We used a Toshiba Satellite A505 computer with an Intel Core processor and 4 GB
RAM. The computational time for each MEDEVAC unit was 413.49 seconds.
Figure 2 shows a depiction of the four zones in southern Afghanistan that we use
to generate our data. It also depicts the MEDEVAC locations, one in each zone.
MEDEVACs 1 and 4 are represented by blue diamonds. Recall that Zones 1 and 4 do
not have MTFs. MEDEVACs 2 and 3, co-located with MTFs 2 and 3, respectively,
are represented by blue dots. The casualty cluster centers in each zone are represented
by black dots.
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Figure 2. MEDEVAC and MTF locations with Casualty Cluster Centers
Figure 3 illustrates several casualty events throughout southern Afghanistan within
a given time period. For simulation purposes, we increase the arrival rate of casualty
events and generate a large number of data points in order to calculate expected
response and service times. This allows us to compute the system utility obtained
when MEDEVAC j responds to a priority k casualty event from Zone i.
Figure 3. Casualty Events throughout southern Afghanistan
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The data generated for the variables in Equation 3.1 vary with each mission and
therefore are represented as random variables. The details of each variable used to
calculate the response time, Rij, are described in the following five paragraphs.
According to subject matter experts and Blackhawk/MEDEVAC pilots, the flight
speed, which accounts for the travel times, T c and Tm, are each uniformly distributed
over an interval of 120 and 150 knots with a resulting mean of 135 knots [15], [14].
Bastian [2] uses a slightly larger range with a flight speed that is also uniformly
distributed between 120 and 193 nautical-miles per hour, but we choose to use the
tighter flight speed parameters provided by the pilots.
The dispatch time, D, is exponentially distributed. Bastian [2] uses a mean of 20
minutes based on a 2008 MEDEVAC after action review and a standard deviation
of five minutes based on his personal experience. Garrett [17] suggests that only
4% of MEDEVAC missions exceed the 15-minute launch criteria established by the
Commander of the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM). We use a mean
of 15 minutes rather than 20 minutes.
The delay caused by an armed escort, E, is exponentially distributed with a mean
of 10 minutes. According to Garrett [17] there is a 31% chance of a MEDEVAC
mission requiring an armed escort, which we denote as θ1, and of those escorted
missions, approximately 4% are delayed due to issues with the escort aircraft, denoted
by θ2. These parameters are factored into the computation for the expected response
times and therefore the utilities.
The casualty load time, Lc, is exponentially distributed with a mean of 10 minutes.
Bastian [2] uses a triangular distribution with a mean of 10 minutes, a minimum of
five minutes, and a maximum of 15 minutes. While we agree with the 10 minute
mean time, this author’s personal experience in Iraq and Afghanistan suggests that
there is too high of a likelihood for extreme variance when dealing with issues on the
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ground at the casualty site. Therefore, we believe that an exponential distribution is
more appropriate.
The casualty unload time, Um, is exponentially distributed with a mean of five
minutes as it typically takes much less time to unload the casualty at the MTF than
it does to load the casualty at the initial injury site. Bastian [2] uses a normal dis-
tribution with a mean of five minutes. Again, we agree with the five-minute mean
time but believe that there is a potential for great variance in this case. The mean
response times we calculate are provided in Table 1.
Table 1. Expected Response Time (minutes)
Zone MEDEVAC 1 MEDEVAC 2 MEDEVAC 3 MEDEVAC 4
Zone 1 (Nimroz) 47.25 51.29 N/A N/A
Zone 2 (Helmand) 43.35 39.27 44.69 N/A
Zone 3 (Kandahar) N/A 46.15 39.49 48.90
Zone 4 (Zabul) N/A N/A 59.34 49.90
Once the mean response times are calculated, we compute the mean service times
in accordance to Equation 3.2. The distribution for the flight speed mentioned above
is used for this travel time as well. The mean service times we calculate are provided
in Table 2.
Table 2. Expected Service Time (minutes)
Zone MEDEVAC 1 MEDEVAC 2 MEDEVAC 3 MEDEVAC 4
Zone 1 (Nimroz) 53.02 51.29 N/A N/A
Zone 2 (Helmand) 49.12 39.27 55.23 N/A
Zone 3 (Kandahar) N/A 56.69 39.49 63.74
Zone 4 (Zabul) N/A N/A 59.34 64.74
In this particular computational example, recall that MEDEVAC units are allowed
both intra and inter-zone responses but are restricted from responding to casualties
more than one zone away from their staging location. For example, if there is a
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casualty in Zone 2, it can be serviced by the MEDEVAC units located in Zones 1, 2
or 3. The casualty is then evacuated to the nearest MTF, MTF 2 in this case. Since
our model in this example applies to a MEDEVAC system with four zones and four
MEDEVAC units, we have the following state space, S = (w, x, y, z):
S = {(0, 0, 0, 0), (w, 0, 0, 0), (0, x, 0, 0), (0, 0, y, 0), (0, 0, 0, z), (w, x, 0, 0), (w, 0, y, 0), (w, 0, 0, z),
(0, x, y, 0), (0, x, 0, z), (0, 0, y, z), (w, x, y, 0), (w, x, 0, z), (0, x, y, z), (w, 0, y, z), (w, x, y, z)},
where
w = 1, 2
x = 1, 2, 3
y = 2, 3, 4
z = 3, 4.
Next, we compute the expected utilities of each MEDEVAC mission for casualty
event classifications of Urgent (A, k = 1), Priority (B, k = 2), and Routine (C,
k = 3). The rewards associated with our model for the MEDEVAC system are
defined by the utility assigned to the selected decision. Recall that the utility rh is
gained by servicing a priority h casualty where r1 > r2 > r3. We let r = (10, 1, 0)
represent the utility gained by servicing a priority h casualty dependent upon the
response time and RTT. We use a RTT of 60 minutes, the US standard directed by
the Secretary of Defense, and 90 minutes, the NATO standard according to Cordell
et al. [6], when computing the utilities of each MEDEVAC mission. Recall that if the
MEDEVAC unit’s response time is within the RTT, the mission gains a utility based
on the number and classification of the casualties evacuated from the casualty event
site. If the response time is greater than the RTT the mission gains a utility of zero.
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Recall that the sum of the utilities for each casualty within the casualty event
yields the total utility for servicing the 9-line MEDEVAC request. Fulton et al. [16]
report that the probability of a casualty being classified as Urgent (A), Priority (B),
or Routine (C) is 11%, 12%, and 77%, respectively, resulting in q=(0.11,0.12,0.77).
Therefore, since r = (10, 1, 0), each MEDEVAC mission that results in a response time
less than the RTT will gain utilities of 10, 1 and 0 for each Urgent (A), Priority (B),
and Routine (C) casualty, respectively, according to c. For example, if a MEDEVAC
mission returns from responding to a casualty event within the RTT with a casualty
load of one Urgent (A), two Priority (B), and one Routine (C), the system earns a
utility of 12. Note that a casualty classified as Routine (C), h = 3, is not awarded a
utility because it is not life-threatening and we are only concerned with the amount
of lives saved as a function of response time. Tables 3 and 4 summarize the computed
utilities, ψkij, of these computations with both a 60 minute RTT and a 90 minute
RTT, respectively.
Table 3. Utility (60 minute RTT)
Zone Category MEDEVAC 1 MEDEVAC 2 MEDEVAC 3 MEDEVAC 4
Zone 1 (Nimroz)
A 8.25 7.67 N/A N/A
B 0.85 0.76 N/A N/A
C 0 0 N/A N/A
Zone 2 (Helmand)
A 8.75 9.12 8.61 N/A
B 0.87 0.90 0.86 N/A
C 0 0 0 N/A
Zone 3 (Kandahar)
A N/A 8.43 9.11 8.11
B N/A 0.84 0.91 0.81
C N/A 0 0 0
Zone 4 (Zabul)
A N/A N/A 6.09 7.92
B N/A N/A 0.61 0.79
C N/A N/A 0 0
In order to use the utilities to find optimal policies for each state, we determine
the 9-line MEDEVAC request arrival rate to the entire system. Fulton et al. [16]
report that during OIF, an expected 173 casualties moved by air in a given month.
Although we are using OEF as our computational example, we use the data provided
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Table 4. Utility (90 minute RTT)
Zone Category MEDEVAC 1 MEDEVAC 2 MEDEVAC 3 MEDEVAC 4
Zone 1 (Nimroz)
A 10.17 10.07 N/A N/A
B 1.01 1.00 N/A N/A
C 0 0 N/A N/A
Zone 2 (Helmand)
A 10.26 10.32 10.24 N/A
B 1.02 1.03 1.02 N/A
C 0 0 0 N/A
Zone 3 (Kandahar)
A N/A 10.20 10.32 10.14
B N/A 1.02 1.03 1.01
C N/A 0 0 0
Zone 4 (Zabul)
A N/A N/A 9.69 10.12
B N/A N/A 0.97 1.01
C N/A N/A 0 0
by Fulton et al. [16] in lieu of data specific for OEF since such data is either classi-
fied or unavailable. Furthermore, the data from OIF serves our purposes since both
OIF and OEF involve stability operations within a counter-insurgency environment
where coalition forces combat similar enemy tactics (e.g., improvised explosive de-
vices, small arms attacks). Fulton et al. [16] also report that of the total casualty
events within a given month, 57.4% consisted of one casualty, 36% consisted of two
casualties, 5% consisted of three casualties, and 1.6% consisted of four casualties.
Therefore, α is a discrete random variable with support {1, 2, 3, 4} and attendant
probabilities (0.574, 0.36, 0.05, 0.016). Straight forward calculation reveals that the
resulting casualty event rate requiring MEDEVAC support is an average of 134 mis-
sions per month, giving us an overall casualty event arrival rate of λ = 1 per 327
minutes to the entire system.
Fulton et al. [16] also report that the probability of a casualty being classified as
Urgent (A), Priority (B), or Routine (C) is 11%, 12%, and 77%, respectively, giving
us q = (0.11, 0.12, 0.77). We can then compute pk, the proportion of priority k 9-line
MEDEVAC requests, obtaining p1 = 0.1587, p2 = 0.1574, and p3 = 0.6839.
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5.2 Results & Optimal Policies
Using the utility values in Tables 3 and 4, we obtain the optimal policy for each
state by applying Equation 4.1. The value iteration algorithm was implemented in
MATLAB, using the same Toshiba Satellite A505 computer with an Intel Core pro-
cessor and 4 GB RAM. Convergence was reached after 29 iterations and the time
required for the initial computation was 20.98 seconds; each policy after that re-
quired < 1 second. The resulting optimal policies for each interesting state, that is,
states that require a decision, are found in Tables 5 through 17. Tables 15 through
17 portray the three states whose optimal dispatch policies differ when the RTT is
changed from 60 to 90 minutes. All other states with RTT = 90 result in identical
policies as with RTT = 60. It is important to note that every state was examined, and
contrary to what McLay & Mayorga [28] point out, the best ambulance to dispatch
to a casualty event does not depend on the locations to which the busy MEDEVACs
have been dispatched. An asterisk (*) is placed next to MEDEVAC units that do
not follow a myopic policy. Changes in the optimal policy caused by one or more
parameters changes are highlighted with italicized text within the appropriate table.
It is expected that a myopic policy will apply to all Urgent casualty events since those
priority levels are the most crucial and thereby produce the highest utilities.
Table 5. Optimal Policy for State (0,0,0,0), RTT = 60 minutes
Priority Level
Urgent Priority Routine
Zone
1 1 1 1
2 2 2 1*
3 3 3 4*
4 4 4 4
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Recall that the arrival rate of 9-line MEDEVAC requests is extremely low for
Zones 1 and 4, 0.004 and 0.073, respectively, and much higher for Zones 2 and 3,
0.585 and 0.338, respectively. As expected, when the RTT = 60 and all MEDEVAC
units are idle, the dispatch policy is myopic for all Urgent and Priority casualty events,
as shown in Table 5. In the event of a Routine casualty event, however, MEDEVAC
1 is dispatched for any casualty events in Zone 2 in order to reserve MEDEVAC 2 for
any higher level casualty events; likewise, MEDEVAC 4 is dispatched for any casualty
events in Zone 3 in order to reserve MEDEVAC 3 for any higher level casualty events.
Table 6. Optimal Policy for State (w,0,0,0), RTT = 60 minutes
Priority Level
Urgent Priority Routine
Zone
1 2 2 2
2 2 2 2
3 3 3 4*
4 4 4 4
When the RTT = 60 and MEDEVAC 1 is busy, a myopic dispatch policy ap-
plies for both Urgent and Priority casualty events, as shown in Table 6. With the
arrival of a Routine casualty event, however, MEDEVAC 3 is not dispatched; in-
stead MEDEVAC 4 is dispatched to Zone 3 in order to reserve MEDEVAC 3 for a
higher level casualty event. This is because it is likely that MEDEVAC 2 will become
busy, and while MEDEVAC 1 is already busy, MEDEVAC 3 is needed to respond to
a 9-line MEDEVAC request in Zone 2 or 3 given the higher arrival rate for those zones.
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Table 7. Optimal Policy for State (0,x,0,0), RTT = 60 minutes
Priority Level
Urgent Priority Routine
Zone
1 1 1 1
2 1 1 1
3 3 3 4*
4 4 4 4
When the RTT = 60 and MEDEVAC 2 is busy, a myopic dispatch policy applies
for both Urgent and Priority casualty events, as shown in Table 7. However, as is
the case when MEDEVAC 1 is busy, if a Routine casualty event occurs, MEDEVAC
3 is reserved for future use. MEDEVACs 1 and 4 are responsible for Zones 2 and
3, respectively, in this state, so that MEDEVAC 3 can be reserved in the event of a
higher level casualty event.
Table 8. Optimal Policy for State (0,0,y,0), RTT = 60 minutes
Priority Level
Urgent Priority Routine
Zone
1 1 1 1
2 2 2 1*
3 2 2 2
4 4 4 4
When the RTT = 60 and MEDEVAC 3 is busy, a myopic dispatch policy applies
with the arrival of both Urgent and Priority level casualty events, as shown in Ta-
ble 8. However, with the arrival of a Routine casualty event, MEDEVAC 1 responds
to casualty events that occur in Zone 2 in order to reserve MEDEVAC 2 exclusively
for Zone 3. This is because if MEDEVAC 2 is not dispatched to Zone 3 while MEDE-
VAC 3 is busy and when a casualty event occurs in Zone 3, MEDEVAC 4 would need
to respond to it. If this occurs, Zone 4 would be without MEDEVAC coverage since
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MEDEVAC 2 is unable to respond to a Zone 4 casualty event arrival.
Table 9. Optimal Policy for State (0,0,0,z), RTT = 60 minutes
Priority Level
Urgent Priority Routine
Zone
1 1 1 1
2 2 2 1*
3 3 3 2*
4 3 3 3
When the RTT = 60 and MEDEVAC 4 is busy, a myopic dispatch policy applies
to Urgent and Priority casualty events, as shown in Table 9. Note that MEDEVAC
3 will be dispatched to Zones 3 or 4 for these higher level casualty events, potentially
allowing a lapse in MEDEVAC coverage for Zone 4. This is because a casualty event
arrival in Zones 2 and 3 is more probable; since these levels of casualty events are
more time sensitive, it is an allowable risk. MEDEVAC 1 is responsible for Zones 1
and 2 with the arrival of a Routine casualty event in order to allow MEDEVACs 2
and 3 to be dispatched to Zones 3 and 4, respectively. This increases the probability
for MEDEVACs 2 and 3 to be idle if a higher level casualty event in Zones 2, 3, or 4
occurs.
Table 10. Optimal Policy for State (w,x,0,0), RTT = 60 minutes
Priority Level
Urgent Priority Routine
Zone
1 N/A N/A N/A
2 3 3 3
3 3 3 4*
4 4 4 4
When the RTT = 60 and MEDEVACs 1 and 2 are both busy, a myopic policy
applies for Urgent and Priority casualty events, as shown in Table 10. Although dis-
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patching MEDEVAC 3 to Zone 3 in this situation will potentially allow a casualty
event arrival in Zone 2 to have a lapse in MEDEVAC coverage, MEDEVAC 4 may
be unable to respond in time due to the further distance between Zones 3 and 4.
Therefore, despite the potential of missed coverage, it is better to respond as quickly
as possible with the closest MEDEVAC unit given an Urgent or Priority casualty
event. With the arrival of a Routine casualty event while MEDEVACs 1 and 2 are
busy, MEDEVAC 3 is reserved for Zone 2 arrivals only while MEDEVAC 4 will be
dispatched to Zones 3 and 4. Since this level of casualty event is not life-threatening,
it is better to reserve MEDEVAC 3 for Zone 2 alone, given the higher ratio of 9-
line MEDEVAC requests for Zone 2. Since MEDEVACs 1 and 2 are both busy and
MEDEVACs 3 and 4 are unable to respond to a casualty event in Zone 1, any ca-
sualty event that occurs in Zone 1 will not be supported with MEDEVAC capabilities.
Table 11. Optimal Policy for State (0,0,y,z), RTT = 60 minutes
Priority Level
Urgent Priority Routine
Zone
1 1 1 1
2 2 2 1*
3 2 2 2
4 N/A N/A N/A
When the RTT = 60 and MEDEVACs 3 and 4 are busy, the dispatch policy for
Urgent and Priority casualty events are myopic, as shown in Table 11. MEDEVAC
2 is responsible for both Zones 2 and 3 while MEDEVAC 1 is responsible for Zone 1
only. This policy allows the risk of a Zone 3 casualty event arrival to be unsupported
if MEDEVAC 2 is busy with a Zone 2 arrival. Although Zones 2 and 3 both have a
relatively high ratio of 9-line MEDEVAC request, it is more important that Urgent
and Priority casualties be responded to as quickly as possible. The dispatch policy
for a Routine casualty event is not myopic. Rather, MEDEVAC 1 is responsible for
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both Zones 1 and 2. This is because this level of casualty event is not life-threatening
so it is more beneficial to reserve MEDEVAC 2 for Zone 3 arrivals or for future higher
level casualty events. Since MEDEVACs 3 and 4 are busy and MEDEVACs 1 and 2
are unable to respond to Zone 4, any casualty event occurring in Zone 4 will not be
supported with MEDEVAC capabilities.
Table 12. Optimal Policy for State (w,0,0,z), RTT = 60 minutes
Priority Level
Urgent Priority Routine
Zone
1 2 2 2
2 2 2 2
3 3 3 2*
4 3 3 3
When the RTT = 60 and MEDEVACs 1 and 4 are busy, a myopic dispatch policy
applies to Urgent and Priority casualty events, as shown in Table 12. However, in
the event of a Routine casualty event, MEDEVAC 3 is reserved while MEDEVAC
2 is responsible for Zones 1, 2, and 3. This is likely due to the distance to a Zone
4 casualty event and the low ratio of casualty event arrivals for Zone 1. With this
policy MEDEVAC 2 will provide MEDEVAC coverage for the first three zones if a
Routine casualty event occurs; this allows MEDEVAC 3 to be responsible for Zone
4 exclusively, reducing the potential for Zone 4 to have a lapse in MEDEVAC coverage.
Table 13. Optimal Policy for State (w,0,y,0), RTT = 60 minutes
Priority Level
Urgent Priority Routine
Zone
1 2 2 2
2 2 2 2
3 2 4 4
4 4 4 4
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When the RTT = 60 and MEDEVACs 1 and 3 are busy, a myopic dispatch pol-
icy applies for all priority classifications of casualty events, as shown in Table 13.
However, MEDEVAC 2 is responsible for Urgent casualty events in Zones 1, 2 and 3
and MEDEVAC 4 is responsible for Zone 4 only. This is because MEDEVAC 4 will
likely need to travel a further distance to Zone 3 from Zone 4 than MEDEVAC 2 will
from Zone 2. Since Urgent casualty events are extremely time sensitive, MEDEVAC
2 is responsible for Zone 3 despite the potential lapse in coverage for Zones 1 and 2
during a Zone 3 response. While still myopic, MEDEVAC 4 is responsible for both
Zones 3 and 4 while MEDEVAC 2 is responsible for Zones 1 and 2 for Priority and
Routine casualty events. Since these levels of casualty events are less time sensitive,
it is better to reserve MEDEVAC 2 for future higher level casualty events. Therefore
it is reasonable that MEDEVAC 2 is responsible for Zones 1 and 2 while MEDEVAC
4 is responsible for Zones 3 and 4.
Table 14. Optimal Policy for State (0,x,0,z), RTT = 60 minutes
Priority Level
Urgent Priority Routine
Zone
1 1 1 1
2 1 1 1
3 3 3 3
4 3 3 3
Similar to Table 13, when the RTT = 60 MEDEVACs 2 and 4 are busy, a myopic
dispatch policy applies to all priority classifications of casualty events, as shown in
Table 14. This is due to the distance required for MEDEVACs 1 and 3 to respond
to each other’s mutually responsible zones, in this case only Zone 2. Although Zone
2 has a very high ratio of casualty event arrivals, Zone 1 has a relatively low ratio.
Likewise, Zone 4 has a lower ratio of casualty event arrivals, whereas the ratio of
casualty event arrivals for Zone 3 is relatively high. Given these ratios, it makes sense
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that MEDEVAC 1 is responsible for Zones 1 and 2 while MEDEVAC 3 is responsible
for Zones 3 and 4.
Table 15. Optimal Policy for State (0,0,0,0), RTT = 90 minutes
Priority Level
Urgent Priority Routine
Zone
1 1 1 1
2 2 2 1*
3 3 3 3
4 4 4 4
Recall that only three optimal policies changed when the RTT = 90 rather than
60. When the RTT = 90 and all MEDEVAC units are idle, the dispatch policy is
myopic for Urgent and Priority casualty events, as shown in Table 15. When a Rou-
tine casualty event occurs, however, MEDEVAC 1 will be dispatched for any casualty
events in Zones 1 and 2 in order to reserve MEDEVAC 2 for any higher priority casu-
alty events. Unlike the policy for this state when the RTT = 60, as shown in Table 5,
MEDEVAC 3 is responsible for Zone 3 rather than MEDEVAC 4. This is because
MEDEVAC 4 is afforded more time when the RTT = 90, allowing it to respond to
Zone 3 if MEDEVAC 3 is busy when a casualty event arrives for Zone 3. This makes
it unnecessary to reserve MEDEVAC 3 for future higher level casualty events.
Table 16. Optimal Policy for State (w,x,0,0), RTT = 90 minutes
Priority Level
Urgent Priority Routine
Zone
1 N/A N/A N/A
2 3 3 3
3 3 4* 4*
4 4 4 4
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When the RTT = 90 and MEDEVACs 1 and 2 are busy, as shown in Table 16,
a myopic dispatch policy applies to Urgent casualty events as it does when the
RTT = 60. However, with an extra 30 minutes allowed for response time, MEDEVAC
4 has ample time to respond to Priority or Routine casualty events in Zone 3, allowing
MEDEVAC 3 to provide MEDEVAC coverage for Zone 2 only. This will reduce the
potential for a casualty in Zone 2 to be without MEDEVAC coverage, which is more
important given the high ratio of 9-line MEDEVAC request arrivals for Zone 2. Since
MEDEVACs 1 and 2 are both busy and MEDEVACs 3 and 4 are unable to respond
to a casualty event in Zone 1, any casualty event that occurs in Zone 1 will not be
supported with MEDEVAC capabilities.
Table 17. Optimal Policy for State (0,0,y,z), RTT = 90 minutes
Priority Level
Urgent Priority Routine
Zone
1 1 1 1
2 2 1* 1*
3 2 2 2
4 N/A N/A N/A
When the RTT = 90 and MEDEVACs 3 and 4 are busy, a myopic dispatch
policy applies to Urgent casualty events, as shown in Table 17, as is the case when
the RTT = 60, depicted in Table 11. However, given an additional 30 minutes for
responding, the dispatch policy is not myopic for Priority or Routine casualty events.
Instead, MEDEVAC 1 is responsible for Zones 1 and 2 while MEDEVAC 2 is only
responsible for Zone 3. This allows MEDEVAC 2 to be reserved in order to provide
MEDEVAC coverage for Zone 3, since Zone 3 cannot be supported by any other
MEDEVAC unit. Given that Zones 2 and 3 have a relatively high casualty event
arrival ratio, it is better to dispatch different MEDEVAC units for these zones since
they are not supported by any other unit given a lower priority casualty event. Since
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MEDEVACs 3 and 4 are busy and MEDEVAC 2 is unable to respond to Zone 4, any
casualty event occurring in Zone 4 will not be supported with MEDEVAC capabilities.
5.3 MEDEVAC System Under Different Scenarios and Policies
In order to further examine the results of our model of the MEDEVAC system
when supporting combat operations, we analyze three different combat scenarios. We
continue to use current operations in support of OEF in southern Afghanistan as the
basis of these scenarios, but change several conditions within the combat environment.
The first scenario we analyze is the base case that we’ve described in previous sections.
Recall that we have looked at steady state stability operations with a relatively low
9-line MEDEVAC arrival rate of λ = 1
327
, modest yet accurate parameters for armed
escort delays within the system, with E = 30 minutes, θ1 = 0.31, and θ2 = 0.04, and
a relatively low rate of Urgent and Priority level casualties and casualty events, with
q1 = 0.11, q2 = 0.12, p1 = 0.1587, p2 = 0.1574.
The second scenario we analyze keeps the same parameters established in the base
case with the exception of the armed escort delay parameters. This scenario reflects
an operational environment with an increase threat level, thereby requiring a higher
ratio of armed escorts per MEDEVAC mission. We consider this scenario with an
increased armed escort delay, E, of 30 minutes, an increased chance of a MEDEVAC
mission requiring an armed escort, θ1 = 0.60, and an increased ratio of MEDEVAC
missions that are delayed due to issues with the armed escort, θ2 = 0.30.
The third scenario we analyze considers a period of time when Coalition Forces
experience a heightened level of enemy activity and therefore an increased number of
casualty events. Stability operations in support of OEF during periods of peak enemy
activity time periods, historically during the summer, will cause several parameters
of our model to increase. In order to gain a realistic perspective of the effect that the
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summer fighting season has on the number of casualty events, we examine the KIA
statistics found on icasualties.org [22]. According to the statistics, operations during
2010 proved to be the most casualty producing, with the summer months accruing
the most KIAs, as expected. As shown in Figure 4, Coalition Forces experienced the
highest number of KIAs during the months of June through August of 2010, with an
average of 90 KIAs per month.
Figure 4. Number of Coalition Forces KIA in 2010
Since we are interested in casualty events, which also include the number of WIAs,
it is necessary to consider the total number of casualties, both KIAs and WIAs, for
our model. According to Gartner [18], the ratio of KIA to WIA in OEF is 0.12.
By straight calculation we determine that an average of 750 casualties occurred each
month during the summer of 2010, which yields an average of 581 casualty events per
month given that the probabilities of there being one, two, three, and four casualties
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per casualty event is α = (0.574, 0.36, 0.05, 0.016). Therefore, we determine that the
casualty event arrival rate during a period of heightened enemy activity is λ = 1
74
.
We also use the increased armed escort delay parameters of E = 30, θ1 = 0.60, and
θ2 = 0.30. During a time of increased attacks against Coalition Forces we also expect
a higher ratio of Urgent and Priority casualties. It is reasonable to assume that the
ratio of Urgent casualties, q1, will increase from 0.11 to 0.25, and the ratio of Priority
casualties, q2, will increase from 0.12 to 0.28, and the ratio of Routine casualties, q3,
to decrease from 0.77 to 0.47. These ratios are obtained arbitrarily as the data is not
readily available. This will cause the ratio of Urgent casualty events, p1, to increase
from 0.1587 to 0.341, the ratio of Priority casualty events, p2, to increase from 0.1574
to 0.304, and the ratio of Routine casualty events, p3, to decrease from 0.6839 to
0.355.
For each of these scenarios, we examine three different policies: an optimal policy,
a myopic policy, and an intra-zone policy. Each policy is a valid decision-making tool
when different constraints or directives affect the combat environment. For example,
an optimal policy, the policy that this paper focuses on and develops, can be used
given the data has been analyzed enough for the specific AO. Moreover, this policy
requires the BCTs responsible for each zone to cooperate with each other in terms of
co-using MEDEVAC assets.
A myopic policy might be used in the decision-making process of dispatching
MEDEVAC units if the response time, Rij, is defined differently and it is more crucial
to reach the casualty quickly than it is to transport the casualty to the MTF quickly.
This difference may be realized with the recent blood transfusion capability that US
MEDEVAC units currently possess. Recall that our response time, Rij, is based on
the fact that blood loss is the leading cause of death on the battlefield and therefore
transporting the casualty to a MTF in order to stop the blood loss and receive a blood
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transfusion is more important than simply reaching the casualty quickly. However,
if a blood transfusion can be administered at the casualty site or enroute to the
MTF, the response time, Rij, will most likely be defined as the time it takes to
reach the casualty site after receipt of the 9-line MEDEVAC request, as opposed
to our definition. In this case, a myopic policy may perform well with dispatching
MEDEVAC units to casualty events. Therefore, it is important to compare a myopic
policy to other policies.
Lastly, an intra-zone policy may be implemented depending on the operating
environment. Recall that an intra-zone policy only allows a MEDEVAC unit to service
casualty events that occur within its respective zone. This policy may be forced upon
the MEDEVAC system if multiple nations or services have adjacent AORs but do not
operate closely with each other and therefore do not share MEDEVAC capabilities.
While each policy is better than simply assuming which MEDEVAC unit is the
best to dispatch to a casualty event, some policies perform better than others in the
long run. It is important to examine the operating environment when implementing
one policy over another. To illustrate this, we examine each of the three policies when
applied to the three different scenarios previously described.
5.3.1 Performance of Different Policies Applied to Stability Opera-
tions (Base Case).
We first examine how each of the three policies previously described will perform
under the circumstances of the base case examined in the majority of this paper.
Recall the input parameters and their respective values; with these values we analyze
the MEDEVAC system with a RTT of 60 minutes. Figure 5 portrays the expected
utility for each zone when the three different policies are implemented. It also portrays
the probability that a MEDEVAC unit will be busy for each policy.
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Figure 5. Stability Operations (Base Case) RTT = 60
The expected utility for Zone 1 is nearly non-existent. This is to be expected since
the proportion of casualty events in Zone 1 is φ1 = 0.004; a change in the operational
environment will affect this whereas a difference in policy or other parameters will
not. We examine a change in φ1 in the subsequent section. The expected utility
of Zones 2 and 3, however, are far greater when an optimal policy is implemented,
with a total of 0.177; this is compared to a total of 0.120 when a myopic policy is
implemented. An intra-zone policy is least preferred with a total expected utility for
Zones 2 and 3 of 0.039. The expected utility for Zone 4 is nearly identical for optimal
and myopic policies, with 0.0132 and 0.0133, respectively. Again, an intra-zone policy
is least preferred with 0.0031. Overall, the total expected zone utilities for optimal,
myopic, and intra-zone policies are 0.191, 0.134, and 0.043, respectively.
When the probabilities of each MEDEVAC being busy are examined, we see no-
table differences. When an optimal policy is implemented, we see that MEDEVACs
1 and 4 are busy far more often with probabilities of 0.0561 and 0.0515, respectively,
than when myopic or intra-zone policies are implemented, with probabilities of 0.0026
and 0.0077, respectively, with a myopic policy and 0.0001 and 0.0023, respectively,
with an intra-zone policy. This is because MEDEVACs 2 and 3 are often rationed
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when using an optimal policy in order to reserve MEDEVACs 2 and 3 for future
higher priority level casualty events. Recall that Zones 2 and 3 have a higher ra-
tio of casualty event arrivals and therefore require MEDEVAC services more often.
When a myopic policy is implemented in this scenario, MEDEVAC 2 is dispatched
far more often than MEDEVAC 1 with a busy probability of 0.0463 compared to
0.0026, respectively, causing a potential lapse in coverage for a casualty event in Zone
2 when RTT = 60. Consequently, MEDEVAC 1 is under-utilized with a myopic
policy. Proportionally, the same outcome exists for Zones 3 and 4, where MEDEVAC
4 is under-utilized when a myopic policy is used in comparison to when an optimal
policy is used. An intra-zone policy simply reflects the proportion of casualty events
in each zone; this policy will most likely prove to be inefficient under circumstances
of higher threat, as well.
When the NATO RTT standard of 90 minutes is applied for the same scenario,
as shown in Figure 6, we see similar results for the zone utilities but some notable
differences with the expected usage of MEDEVAC units.
Figure 6. Stability Operations (Base Case) RTT = 90
The expected utilities for Zones 1, 2 and 4 are nearly identical, proportionally,
when compared to the scenario with a RTT of 60 minutes; as expected, the utilities
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for each of these zones increases slightly due to higher mission utilities when the
MEDEVAC units have 30 additional minutes to respond to a casualty event. The
utility for Zone 3, however, is nearly the same when an optimal or myopic policy
is applied, 0.0536 and 0.0505, respectively. Note that with a RTT of 90 minutes,
the utility for Zone 3 decreases when using an optimal policy, which is not intuitive
at first. One would most likely expect to see the zone utility to increase for this
zone as well. However, by looking at the changes in optimal policies when the RTT
= 90 rather than 60, we see that MEDEVAC 3 is dispatched to Zone 3 for Routine
casualty events instead of MEDEVAC 4 when the system is in state (0,0,0,0). We also
see that MEDEVAC 4 is dispatched to Zone 3 for Priority casualty events instead of
MEDEVAC 3 when the system is in state (w,x,0,0). The unrewarded Routine casualty
events that MEDEVAC 3 responds to in Zone 3 may account for the decrease in zone
utility. The total zone utility when an optimal policy is applied increases to 0.194
when the RTT = 90 and increases to 0.154 and 0.049 when myopic or intra-zone
policies applied, respectively.
When an optimal policy is applied, the probabilities of each MEDEVAC unit
being busy differ substantially when the RTT is 90 minutes rather than 60 minutes.
However, the expected MEDEVAC utilizations remained the same when either myopic
or intra-zone policies are applied. Therefore we focus on the differences when an
optimal policy is being used. When this is the case, the probabilities are very similar
for MEDEVACs 1 and 2 regardless of the RTT change, but are quite different for
MEDEVACs 3 and 4. MEDEVAC 4 is utilized much less when the RTT is 90 minutes,
whereas MEDEVAC 3 is utilized much more. This is because the optimal policies
change for states (0,0,0,0) and (w,x,0,0) when the RTT = 90. Since MEDEVAC 3
is dispatched to Zone 3 for Routine casualty events rather than MEDEVAC 4 and
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Routine casualty events account for 77% of the MEDEVAC missions, the decrease in
usage of MEDEVAC 4 and increase in usage of MEDEVAC 3 is intuitive.
5.3.2 Stability Operations With Increased Armed Escort Delay Pa-
rameters.
A change that may occur with a heightened level of enemy activity, such as dur-
ing the summer of 2010, is the number of times troops will be in direct contact with
the enemy, thereby requiring the support of Air Weapons Teams or Scout Weapons
Teams. These are the same helicopter teams that provide an armed escort to MEDE-
VAC units. If troops are in contact with the enemy more often there will be a higher
demand for these helicopter teams, resulting in a higher armed escort delay within
our model. We examine what would occur within our model if the armed escort delay,
E, is increased from 10 to 30 minutes. We also increase the chance of requiring an
armed escort, θ1, from 31% to 60%. Of those MEDEVAC missions that require an
armed escort, we increase the chance of a delay due to issues with the escort air-
craft, θ2, from 4% to 30%. These different percentages are arbitrarily derived but are
reasonable given a high operational tempo during heightened levels of enemy activity.
Even with such a large increase in the parameters for the armed escort, only two
states experience a change in their optimal policies: states (0,0,y,0) and (w,0,0,z). For
state (0,0,y,0), the additional armed escort delay causes MEDEVAC 2 to be reserved
when a Routine casualty event arrives in Zone 3, dispatching MEDEVAC 4 in its
place. This will allow MEDEVAC 2 to respond to future higher level casualty events
instead, as shown in Table 18.
With an increased armed escort delay, the optimal policy for state (w,0,0,z) no
longer dispatches MEDEVAC 2 to Zone 3 for a Routine casualty event, but instead
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Table 18. Optimal Policy for State (0,0,y,0), RTT = 60 minutes, Increased AE delay
Priority Level
Urgent Priority Routine
Zone
1 1 1 1
2 2 2 1*
3 2 2 4
4 4 4 4
becomes myopic, thereby dispatching MEDEVAC 3, as shown in Table 19. This
change allows MEDEVAC 2 to respond to Zones 1 and 2 only, regardless of the ca-
sualty event priority classification.
Table 19. Optimal Policy for State (w,0,0,z), RTT = 60 minutes, Increased AE delay
Priority Level
Urgent Priority Routine
Zone
1 2 2 2
2 2 2 2
3 3 3 3
4 3 3 3
When the optimal policy is compared to the myopic and intra-zone policies with
a RTT of 60 minutes, as shown in Figure 7, we find that the zone utility is identical
when using an optimal policy. The zone utilities are nearly the same when using
myopic or intra-zone policies, with slight increases for both. The total zone utilities
for optimal, myopic, and intra-zone policies are 0.191, 0.139, and 0.045, respectively.
In regards to the expected usage of each MEDEVAC, we see little change between
the different policies used. Intuitively, each MEDEVAC has a slightly higher prob-
ability of being busy regardless of which policy is applied to the system. Note that
MEDEVACs 2 and 3 continue to be used much less often than MEDEVACs 1 and 4
in order to reserve them for higher casualty event arrivals in Zones 2 and 3.
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Figure 7. Stability Operations With Increased Armed Escort Delay Parameters, RTT
= 60
When the RTT is changed from 60 to 90 minutes, there is a noticeable increase in
the zone utilities for each of the three different policies, as shown in Figure 8. Overall,
however, the optimal policy shows the largest improvement over it’s already larger
total zone utility. Specifically, there is an increase of 0.0495 in zone utility when an
optimal policy is applied, with a total zone utility of 0.241; there is an increase of
0.0284 in zone utility when a myopic policy is applied, with a total zone utility of
0.167; lastly, there is an increase of 0.0087 in zone utility when an intra-zone policy is
applied, with a total zone utility of 0.0532. When the RTT = 90, there is no change
to the probabilities of each MEDEVAC being busy regardless of the policy method
applied.
5.3.3 Stability Operations During Heightened Enemy Activity.
Our base case scenario involves steady state stability operations with a relatively
low occurrence of enemy activity compared to conflicts with more severe casualty
events. Therefore, it is imperative that we apply our model to a more hostile environ-
ment. As previously described, we look at a period during OEF when enemy activity
was at its highest level, the summer months of 2010.
52
Figure 8. Stability Operations With Increased Armed Escort Delay Parameters, RTT
= 90
Changing the parameters within our model to reflect the heightened level of enemy
activity experienced in the summer of 2010, we see that, with a RTT of 60 minutes,
zone utilities for each policy method increased by a large margin. The total zone
utilities when an optimal, myopic, or intra-zone policy is applied to a MEDEVAC
system with increased enemy activity are 1.28, 0.717, and 0.265, respectively. How-
ever, as Figure 9 depicts, the zone utilities increased proportionally; therefore, the
relative performance of each policy method does not change with increased casualty
event arrivals when compared.
Intuitively, the probability of each MEDEVAC unit increased by a large margin
as well. MEDEVACs 1 and 4 continue to be used more often than MEDEVACs 2 and
3, but with a heightened level of enemy activity, MEDEVACs 2 and 3 are not able
to be rationed as often as they were in the first two scenarios. MEDEVAC 3 is the
least busy, however, being used almost half as much as the other three MEDEVACs.
As with the other scenarios, the myopic policy dispatches MEDEVACs 2 and 3 the
most while under-utilizing MEDEVACs 1 and 4.
When the RTT is increased to 90 minutes, we find that the zone utilities for each
policy method increase, as shown in Figure 10. This is intuitive since the mission
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Figure 9. Stability Operations With Increased Enemy Activity, RTT = 60
utilities also increase. However, the proportion of increase is quite different under
the heightened enemy activity parameters. By applying an optimal policy, little
improvement is realized with only a 3.7% gain, from 1.28 to 1.33. When myopic
or intra-zone policies are applied, however, nearly the same increase is achieved as
when the RTT was changed from 60 to 90 minutes in the large AE delay scenario;
an increase of 0.148 in zone utility, from 0.717 to 0.865, for a myopic policy, and an
increase of 0.052 in zone utility, from 0.265 to 0.317, for an intra-zone policy.
The probabilities of MEDEVACs 1, 2 and 3 being busy in a system with heightened
enemy activity and a RTT of 90 minutes are very similar, with MEDEVAC 1 being
used the most and MEDEVACs 2 and 3 being used less. Unexpectedly, however, while
MEDEVAC 4 is used in the same fashion as in the other scenarios when a myopic
or intra-zone policy method is applied, its use differs greatly when an optimal policy
method is applied. MEDEVAC 4 is the least used unit when an optimal policy is
applied, indicating that MEDEVACs 2 and 3 are not rationed as often as they are in
the other scenarios or when the RTT = 60.
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Figure 10. Stability Operations With Increased Enemy Activity, RTT = 90
5.4 Sensitivity Analysis
5.4.1 Change in Arrival Rate.
As portrayed in the example of a combat environment during periods of time with
elevated enemy activity, the arrival rate is a parameter in our model that is quite
sensitive. For example, if we use our model in an operating environment where a
casualty event occurs once every 30 minutes, λ = 1
30
, but all other parameters remain
unchanged, our system of only one MEDEVAC unit per zone could be expected to
be busy at all times since the service rate is much less, sometimes by half, the arrival
rate. However, recall that since our system operates with an inter and intra-zone
policy, MEDEVAC units from other zones are able to respond to casualty events in
their own zone as well as zones adjacent to them. This allows greater flexibility with
an increased arrival rate. We show the effects of a busier MEDEVAC system given
a higher arrival rate in the previous section; however, to examine how sensitive this
parameter is, we look at changes in the optimal policy throughout a range of different
arrival rates. We examine these changes when the RTT = 60 only.
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When λ = 1
30
, six states experience at least one change in their optimal policies
while they remain the same for the other four states. When all MEDEVAC units are
idle, state (0,0,0,0), MEDEVAC 3 is dispatched to Zone 3 for Routine casualty events
instead of MEDEVAC 4. When MEDEVAC 3 is busy, state (0,0,y,0), MEDEVAC 4
is dispatched to Zone 3 instead of MEDEVAC 2 for Priority and Routine casualty
events. When MEDEVAC 4 is busy, state (0,0,0,z), MEDEVAC 3 is dispatched to
Zone 3 for Routine casualty events instead of MEDEVAC 2. When MEDEVACs 3
and 4 are busy, state (0,0,y,z), MEDEVAC 1 is dispatched to Zone 2 for Priority
casualty events instead of MEDEVAC 2. When MEDEVACs 1 and 4 are busy, state
(w,0,0,z), MEDEVAC 3 is dispatched to Zone 3 for Routine casualty events instead of
MEDEVAC 2. Lastly, when MEDEVACS 1 and 2 are busy, state (w,x,0,0), MEDE-
VAC 4 is dispatched to Zone 3 for Priority casualty events instead of MEDEVAC 3.
As shown in Figure 11, when the casualty event arrival rate is increased to λ = 1
30
,
zone utilities are dramatically increased. This is intuitive since many more casualty
events are serviced. Moreover, a large increase in each MEDEVAC’s busy probabili-
ties is seen. The pattern for these probabilities remains the same when a myopic or
intra-zone policy method is applied to the system, but differs when an optimal policy
method is applied. The most notable difference is that, proportionally, MEDEVAC
4 is used less than before while MEDEVAC 3 is used more often.
We focus on the state when every MEDEVAC unit is idle, state (0,0,0,0), as
this state is one whose optimal policy changes with a busier system. When each
MEDEVAC unit is idle within a busier system, a change in policy occurs when there
is a Routine casualty event arrival. With the original arrival rate of one casualty event
every 327 minutes, the policy for a Routine casualty event is to dispatch MEDEVAC
4 to Zone 3 in order to reserve MEDEVAC 3 for future higher level casualty events,
as shown in Table 5. However, the policy for this state requires MEDEVAC 3 to
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Figure 11. Change in Arrival Rate, λ = 130 , RTT = 60
respond to a Routine casualty event in Zone 3 when the arrival rate is one casualty
per 30 minutes, as shown in Table 20.
Table 20. Optimal Policy for State (0,0,0,0), RTT = 60 minutes, λ = 130
Priority Level
Urgent Priority Routine
Zone
1 1 1 1
2 2 2 1*
3 3 3 3
4 4 4 4
The optimal policy for this state continues to change depending on the arrival
rate. For example, when one 9-line MEDEVAC request arrives every minute, λ = 1
1
,
the dispatch policy for Urgent casualty events is myopic whereas Priority and Routine
casualty events only dispatch MEDEVACs 1 and 4, thereby reserving MEDEVACs 2
and 3 for higher level casualty events, as shown in Table 21.
When 9-line MEDEVAC requests arrive once every two through eight minutes,
λ = 1
2
to 1
8
, the optimal policy remains the same for Urgent and Routine casualty
events, but changes for Priority casualty events. Priority casualty events require
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Table 21. Optimal Policy for State (0,0,0,0), RTT = 60 minutes, λ = 11
Priority Level
Urgent Priority Routine
Zone
1 1 1 1
2 2 1 1*
3 3 4 4*
4 4 4 4
MEDEVAC 3 to respond to 9-line MEDEVAC requests in Zone 3 since there is slightly
less demand in the system, as shown in Table 22.
Table 22. Optimal Policy for State (0,0,0,0), RTT = 60 minutes, λ = 12 to
1
8
Priority Level
Urgent Priority Routine
Zone
1 1 1 1
2 2 1 1*
3 3 3 4*
4 4 4 4
When 9-line MEDEVAC requests arrive once every nine minutes to once ever 27
minutes, λ = 1
9
to 1
27
, or once every 80 minutes or less, λ ≤ 1
80
, the dispatch policy is
myopic for Urgent and Priority casualty events, whereas only MEDEVACs 1 and 4
respond to Routine casualty events, thereby reserving MEDEVACs 2 and 3 for future
higher level arrivals. Note that this policy is the same as the base case that has an
arrival rate of λ = 1
327
. This is shown in Table 23.
Table 23. Optimal Policy for State (0,0,0,0), RTT = 60 minutes, λ = 19 to
1
27 or λ ≤
1
80
Priority Level
Urgent Priority Routine
Zone
1 1 1 1
2 2 2 1*
3 3 3 4*
4 4 4 4
When 9-line MEDEVAC requests arrive once every 28 through 79 minutes, λ = 1
28
to 1
79
, the optimal policy is myopic for Urgent and Priority casuatly events. Routine
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casualty events, however, dispatch MEDEVAC 3 to Zone 3 since there is even less
demand in the system. This is shown in Table 24.
Table 24. Optimal Policy for State (0,0,0,0), RTT = 60 minutes, λ = 128 to
1
79
Priority Level
Urgent Priority Routine
Zone
1 1 1 1
2 2 2 1*
3 3 3 3
4 4 4 4
5.4.2 Change in φi, the proportion of 9-line MEDEVAC requests in
demand Zone i.
We also consider changing the casualty zone ratio, φi = 0.004, 0.585, 0.338, 0.073;
since Zones 1 and 4 have relatively low ratios we focus on increasing φ1 and φ4 sepa-
rately while keeping the proportionality of the other zone ratios intact. For example,
by changing φ1 to 0.35, φ2 becomes 0.382, φ3 becomes 0.220, and φ4 becomes 0.048.
By increasing the proportion of casualty events in Zone 1, we see in Figure 12 that
the zone utility for Zone 1 increases drastically while the utilities for the other three
zones decrease. This is quite intuitive since servicing more MEDEVAC missions will
yield a higher utility; therefore, the more casualty events that occur in a particular
zone, the more potential utility that zone will have. Note that the probability that
MEDEVAC 1 will be busy decreases greatly while the probability that MEDEVAC
2 is busy increases. This indicates that when φ = 0.35, MEDEVAC 1 is rationed for
higher level casualty events.
Once again we look at the state when all MEDEVAC units are idle, state (0,0,0,0).
We know from Table 5 that, under the base case parameters, a myopic policy applies
to Urgent and Priority casualty events while MEDEVAC 1 is dispatched to Zones 1
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Figure 12. Change in Proportion of 9-line MEDEVAC requests for Zone i, φ1 = 0.35,
RTT = 60
and 2 for a Routine casualty event and MEDEVAC 4 is dispatched to Zones 3 and
4. However, when the casualty zone ratio is increased for Zone 1 so that φ1 ≥ .22,
MEDEVAC 2 is dispatched to Zone 2 instead of MEDEVAC 1, as shown in Table 25.
Note that MEDEVAC 4 is still dispatched to Zones 3 and 4 for Routine casualty
events in order to reserve MEDEVAC 3 for future higher priority casualty events.
Table 25. Optimal Policy for State (0,0,0,0), RTT = 60 minutes, φ1 = 0.22
Priority Level
Urgent Priority Routine
Zone
1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2
3 3 3 4*
4 4 4 4
We also look at a state when one MEDEVAC unit is busy. The optimal policy
for the system when one MEDEVAC unit is busy is relatively identical whether the
busy MEDEVAC is 1, 2, 3, or 4. In each of these states the optimal policy is myopic
for Urgent and Priority casualty events whereas Routine events require one or more
MEDEVAC unit to be reserved for future casualty events. Therefore, examining
state (w,0,0,0), we know from Table 6 that a myopic policy applies to Urgent and
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Priority casualty events, whereas only MEDEVACs 2 and 4 are dispatched for Routine
casualty events, thereby reserving MEDEVAC 3 for future higher priority casualty
events. However, when φ1 ≥ 0.03, MEDEVAC 2 is responsible for Zone 1 only when
MEDEVAC 3 is responsible for Zone 2 for Routine casualty events while the system
is in state (w,0,0,0), as shown in Table 26.
Table 26. Optimal Policy for State (w,0,0,0), RTT = 60 minutes, φ1 = 0.03
Priority Level
Urgent Priority Routine
Zone
1 2 2 2
2 2 2 3*
3 3 3 4*
4 4 4 4
When changing φ4 we look at the system when all MEDEVAC units are idle, state
(0,0,0,0). We know from Table 5 that MEDEVAC 4 is only responsible for Zone 4 for
Urgent and Priority casualty events, but is dispatched to Zones 3 and 4 for Routine
casualty events. However, if φ4 is increased to 0.078, MEDEVAC 3 will be dispatched
to Zone 3 for Routine casualty events in order to allow MEDEVAC 4 to respond to
Zone 4 only, as shown in Table 27. Note that MEDEVAC 1 is still responsible for
Zones 1 and 2 in order to reserve MEDEVAC 2 for future higher priority casualty
events.
Table 27. Optimal Policy for State (0,0,0,0), RTT = 60 minutes, φ1 = 0.078
Priority Level
Urgent Priority Routine
Zone
1 1 1 1
2 2 2 1*
3 3 3 3
4 4 4 4
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Moreover, if φ4 is increased to 0.12 then the system will dispatch MEDEVAC 3 to
Zones 3 and 4 for Routine casualty events, thereby reserving MEDEVAC 4 for future
higher priority casualty events, as shown in Table 28.
Table 28. Optimal Policy for State (0,0,0,0), RTT = 60 minutes, φ1 = 0.12
Priority Level
Urgent Priority Routine
Zone
1 1 1 1
2 2 2 1*
3 3 3 3
4 4 4 3*
Lastly, we look at the system when one MEDEVAC unit is busy, in this case when
MEDEVAC 3 is busy, state (0,0,y,0). As shown in Table 8, a myopic dispatch policy
applies to Urgent and Priority casualty events. For Routine casualty events, however,
MEDEVAC 1 is responsible for both Zones 1 and 2. When φ4 is decreased to 0.065,
only MEDEVACs 1 and 4 are dispatched, reserving MEDEVAC 2 for future higher
priority casualty events, as shown in Table 29.
Table 29. Optimal Policy for State (0,0,y,0), RTT = 60 minutes, φ1 = 0.065
Priority Level
Urgent Priority Routine
Zone
1 1 1 1
2 2 2 1*
3 2 2 4*
4 2* 2* 4
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VI. Conclusions
Discussion and Results
The nature of the MEDEVAC mission is one of urgency; therefore little time is af-
forded to the decision maker when a 9-line MEDEVAC request is received in regards
to what MEDEVAC unit should be dispatched. An instinctive reaction is to dispatch
the nearest MEDEVAC unit in order to respond to the casualty event as soon as
possible. This follows the logic of a myopic policy. However, this can result in grave
consequences if a MEDEVAC unit is dispatched to a low priority casualty event and
is therefore busy when a higher priority casualty event occurs in that unit’s zone.
Rapid blood loss on the battlefield is the leading cause of death according to current
statistics, and providing rapid medical support is essential to preserving the lives of
our soldiers. Losing a soldier to a gunshot wound or improvised explosive device be-
cause the nearest MEDEVAC unit is busy servicing a Routine casualty event such as
a broken leg is unacceptable. Our model proves to be useful by providing a decision
rule that dispatches the most appropriate MEDEVAC unit to casualty events and po-
tentially rations a closer, and sometimes more intuitive, MEDEVAC unit for future
casualty events that may be more time sensitive. To complicate the decision-making
process, situations with a high threat level require armed helicopters to escort the
MEDEVAC unit to the casualty site, creating a potential delay in the response time.
We use a computational example based on the current operational environment in
Afghanistan to apply a MDP model using our value iteration dynamic programming
algorithm to develop an optimal policy for dispatching MEDEVAC units that may
save soldiers’ lives.
Since we know the location and priority level of each casualty event with the receipt
of a 9-line MEDEVAC request, we determine which MEDEVAC unit to dispatch in
order to maximize the steady-state system utility. The utility gained from servicing a
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specific request depends on the number of casualties, the priority class of the casualty
event, and the location of both the servicing MEDEVAC unit and casualty site. The
location of the casualty site informs us on the dispatch options while the priority level
informs us on which MEDEVAC unit to dispatch.
Results indicate that a myopic policy is not always the best method to use for
quickly dispatching MEDEVAC units under differing threat conditions while conduct-
ing combat operations under a variety of different parameters. Although a myopic
policy performs better than an intra-zone policy, neither of these policies produce a
higher zone utility than the optimal policy method does throughout several parameter
changes and scenario alterations.
Analysis of the results indicate that when applying an optimal policy to a MEDE-
VAC system, the MEDEVAC that is dispatched in response to a 9-line MEDEVAC
request is highly dependent upon the proportion of casualty events per zone. From
studying our computational example, with a system that has a relatively low propor-
tion of casualty events in Zones 1 and 4, MEDEVACs 1 and 4 are used as often as
possible to respond to casualty events not only in their respective zones but also to
casualty events in Zones 2 and 3, respectively. This enables MEDEVACs 2 and 3 to
be reserved for only the higher level casualty events. This reduces the potential for
a MEDEVAC unit being busy servicing a Routine casualty event when an Urgent or
Priority casualty event arrives in its own respective zone.
Another parameter that the optimal policy method is dependent upon is the
casualty event arrival rate, λ. When this parameter is changed to a relatively high
rate, λ = 1
30
, the optimal policy changed in six of the 10 possible states within our
computational example. On the contrary, the armed escort delay is not as sensitive
as expected. While an increased delay produces lower zone utilities, it only changes
the optimal policy for two of the 10 states in our computational example.
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Analyzing the results of our model also reveals that the myopic policy follows
the same dispatch pattern with each parameter alteration. While this policy method
produces different zone utilities and probabilities of each MEDEVAC being busy,
these changes are only reflective of the increased or decreased ratio of casualty events
per zone, regardless of their urgency. MEDEVACs 2 and 3 are consistently busy
while MEDEVACs 1 and 4 are under-utilized; this is because a myopic policy does
not consider rationing MEDEVAC units whose zones are expected to receive urgent or
priority casualty event arrivals more often than other zones. These factors consistently
produce a lower zone utility than a system using an optimal policy does.
Although a myopic policy proves to be inferior to an optimal policy, an intra-zone
policy is inferior to both. An intra-zone policy simply dispatches MEDEVAC units
when a casualty event occurs in their respective zones, giving no consideration to the
parameters within our model. No decision is required when deciding which MEDE-
VAC unit to dispatch, and many casualty events are likely not serviced when this
policy is applied, resulting in a total zone utility for each scenario examined that is
dramatically less than the other two policy methods.
Potential Future Research
While our model is useful, it also has several limitations as a number of aspects are
not examined. For example, we do not allow MEDEVAC units to respond to casualty
events until they return to their original staging location, although realistically a
MEDEVAC unit is able to be diverted to such missions given it has the necessary fuel
and equipment. This will certainly reduce the response time for many casualty events
given the 9-line MEDEVAC request is received shortly after a nearby MEDEVAC unit
has unloaded its casualties. Also, future research could examine the probabilities the
65
system has to be in each state in order to determine how often a lapse in coverage
occurs.
We also do not consider that a response time under 60 or 90 minutes could yield a
greater utility for Urgent casualty events given that a proportion of Urgent casualties
will not survive under the US or NATO standard RTTs, but may survive if the
mission was completed in less time. Moreover, we do not allow MEDEVAC units
to be placed in a queue; if this was possible, MEDEVAC units could be dispatched
to casualty event sites from nearby MTFs directly after unloading casualties from
the prior mission. Other than receiving no utility, our model does not capture the
negative effect of casualty events not provided with MEDEVAC support, thereby
using non-standard CASEVAC either by ground or air; a queuing system may provide
an otherwise unsupported casualty with crucial medical aid in a more timely manner.
Another possibility for future research involves basing the priority level of the
casualty event on the zone from which the event originates. For example, the propor-
tion of Urgent casualty events may be much greater in Zone 2 than in Zone 1, and
those probabilities could be incorporated within the model. Resource emplacement
could encompass this aspect of the MEDEVAC system. Our model does not consider
resource emplacement such as forward positioning MEDEVAC units in areas histor-
ically likely to receive 9-line MEDEVAC requests, specifically Urgent requests. By
changing a MEDEVAC unit’s staging location based on current data, the response
time could be reduced by a great enough margin to save lives.
Lastly, our model does not incorporate the recent MEDEVAC capability of pro-
viding blood transfusions enroute to the MTF. Recall that our response time, the
time required to transport a casualty from receipt of the 9-line MEDEVAC request to
an appropriate MTF, is based on the fact that blood loss is the primary cause of death
in a combat environment. If this new capability is incorporated into our model, the
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response time parameters will change. Similarly, further examination could consider
survival probabilities for MEDEVAC units providing different medical capabilities;
for example, MEDEVAC units typically have flight medics on board, but on occasion
will have a physician’s assistant or surgeon. These additional assets would likely in-
crease the casualty survival rate. While our model is thorough in many aspects there
is room for improvement, and all of these limitations should be examined in future
research.
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Appendix: Table of Notation
D = Total dispatching time; the amount of time required between the receipt of the
9-line MEDEVAC request and the MEDEVAC departure.
T c = The amount of time it takes for the MEDEVAC unit to travel from its staging
area to the casualty site.
E = The amount of time an armed escort delays the MEDEVAC unit.
θ1 = The chance of a MEDEVAC mission requiring an armed escort.
θ2 = The ratio of MEDEVAC missions requiring an armed escort that are delayed
due to issues with the escort aircraft.
Lc = The amount of time the MEDEVAC unit spends at the casualty site in order
to begin initial treatment and load the casualty onto the helicopter.
Tm = The amount of time it takes for the MEDEVAC unit to travel from the casualty
site to the nearest appropriate MTF.
Um = The amount of time it takes for the MEDEVAC crew to unload the patient at
the MTF.
T s = The amount of time it takes the MEDEVAC unit to travel from the MTF back
to its original staging area.
Rij = Total response time for MEDEVAC j to respond to a casualty event in Zone
i and transport the casualty to the nearest appropriate MTF; This is defined as the
sum of the dispatch time D, travel time to the casualty site T c, potential armed escort
delay E, the load time at the casualty site Lc, travel time to the appropriate medical
facility Tm, and the unload time at the medical treatment facility Um.
Vij = Total service time for MEDEVAC j to respond to a casualty event in Zone
i, transport the casualty to the nearest appropriate MTF and return to its original
staging area; This is defined as Rij + T
s.
λ = 9-line MEDEVAC request arrival rate to the entire system.
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d = Total number of demand zones.
m = Total number of MEDEVAC units.
φi = Proportion of 9-line MEDEVAC requests from demand Zone i such that:
n∑
i=1
φi =
1.
pk = Proportion of priority k 9-line MEDEVAC requests such that:
3∑
k=1
pk = 1.
λi = λφi, the 9-line MEDEVAC request arrival rate from demand Zone i.
µij = Service rate of MEDEVAC j when servicing a casualty event in Zone i.
sjt = The state of MEDEVAC j at time t.
A(st) = The set of available decisions in state st upon receipt of a 9-line MEDEVAC
request.
ψkij = Utility gained by MEDEVAC j servicing a casualty event with priority k in
Zone i.
α = A discrete random variable that denotes the number of casualties that occur
within a casualty event.
qh = The probability of a casualty belonging to priority class h.
ch = The number of casualties belonging to priority class h within a casualty event.
rh = The utility gained by servicing a priority h casualty.
uk(c) = The expected utility the system gains for responding to a single casualty
event c.
ν = Determines the maximum rate of transition, λ + max service rate, allowing us
to state an equivalent discrete-time MDP as the original continuous-time MDP by
uniformization.
βj = The maximum service rate
Jt(st) = The value of being in state st during iteration t.
RTT = The response time threshold, which is the maximum response time allowed
in order to gain a utility for that MEDEVAC mission.
69
t9 = The time at which a 9-line MEDEVAC request is received.
M9 = The time at which a MEDEVAC unit is assigned to a casualty event.
Md = The time at which the MEDEVAC unit is dispatched, ”wheels up.”
wc9 = The time at which the MEDEVAC unit begins treatment/loading of a casualty.
ec9 = The time at which the MEDEVAC unit departs the casualty site with the
casualty.
wm9 = The time at which the MEDEVAC unit begins unloading the casualty at the
MTF.
em9 = The time at which the casualty is successfully unloaded and admitted to the
MTF.
W s9 = The time at which the MEDEVAC unit arrives back at its original staging
area.
st = State of the MEDEVAC unit at time t.
S = State space.
IRij = Indicator variable which equals one when Rij ≤ RTT and zero otherwise.
ν = The maximum rate of transition, λ+
m∑
j=1
βj; uniformization.
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